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Liability for Transnational Pollution
Caused by Offshore Oil Rig Blowouts
By WILLIAM N. HANCOCK AND ROBERT M. STONE
Members of the Class of 1982.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 1971, an exploratory oil well located in Mexican na-
tional waters off the Yucatan Peninsula suffered a serious blowout.'
The well, which was being drilled by the Mexican national oil com-
pany, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), pumped 3.1 million barrels of
crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico before it was capped more than nine
months later.2 The slick created by the spill crept northward, crossed
into United States waters, and fouled the Texas coast barrier islands
and Texas mainland beaches.' It caused indirect damage to the Texas
coast tourist industry, and it was feared that the slick would also have
an impact on the Gulf Coast fishing industry.4
In September of 1979, United States Gulf Coast fishermen, local
governments on the Texas coast, and representatives of the Texas coast
tourist industry filed suit in federal district court seeking $255 million
in damages for injuries caused by the spill.5 Named as defendants in
one or more of the suits were PEMEX,6 Sedco (the U.S. company
which owned the drilling rig involved in the blowout), and Perfora-
ciones Marinas del Golfo (Permargo), a private Mexican drilling con-
tractor that had leased the rig.7
1. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1979, at I, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
3. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
4. Id at 26, col. 1.
5. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1979, § 2, at 31, col. 6. Also, in June 1980, the United States
House of Representatives authorized $80 million for compensation to U.S. citizens and busi-
nesses that suffered losses as a result of the spill. H.R. 5338, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
N.Y. Times, June 17, 1980, at B7, col. 6.
6. PEMEX is the nationalized oil company of Mexico, and thus essentially an arm of
the government.
7. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1979, at 6, col. 6. For more information on the suits filed see
Comment, Voyage Into Uncertainty: Assigning Liab&lityor the Bay of Campeche Oil Spill 9
ENVT'L L.R. 10218 (1979).
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In the face of these claims, the Mexican government stated that it
would pay nothing to the United States for damages caused by the
spill,8 implying that the government believed it was not liable for the
damage under principles of customary international law.9
This Note will explore the liability of one nation for damage to
another nation caused by an oil spill which originates from a drilling
platform operating within the first nation's territorial waters. The au-
thors conclude that there is ample authority in customary international
law to support the proposition that a state is liable under these circum-
stances. However, no treaty has directly addressed the problem of na-
tional liability for international oil pollution caused by offshore drilling
platform blowouts.' Therefore, this Note will also explore the reasons
why no such treaty exists and will offer suggestions to facilitate the fu-
ture implementation of a treaty addressing this problem.
II. SOURCES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
SUPPORTING LIABILITY"
The argument that a state is liable for transnational pollution
caused by oil exploration activities occurring within its territory is sup-
ported by the decision in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,'2 Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,13 the concept
of territorial sovereignty,' 4 and the conventions which address interna-
tional pollution caused by spills from oil tankers.
15
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
9. See Wells, Mexico's Burden in a 2-Million-Barrel Spill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979,
§ 4, at 18, col. 4.
10. Lay, Pollution From Off-Shore Wells, in 3 NEw DIRECTIONS IN LAW OF THE SEA,
COLLECTED PAPERS 103 (1973).
I1. The sources of international law are summarized in article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice:
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) International custom, as evidence
of a general practice as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations; (d) Subject to the provisions of Article 9, [denying precedential
value to decisions of the I.C.J.] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
See generaly I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1979); G.
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS (4th ed. 1981).
12. See text accompanying notes 16-32 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 33-40 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 41-48 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 51-86 infra.
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A. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
The Trail Smelter Arbitration involved a claim by the United
States against Canada.16 The United States sought damages for harm
caused to the State of Washington by fumes originating from a pri-
vately owned smelter located in British Columbia.
The Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal) was convened
under the authority of a 1935 convention between the United States
and Canada. 7 The two countries initially agreed that Canada would
pay the United States $350,000 as compensation.' 8 This initial pay-
ment was only intended to cover damages sustained up to January 1,
1932.19 After agreeing upon this initial payment, the parties also
agreed to form an arbitration Tribunal to determine liability for any
future damages. °
In its final decision,21 the Tribunal determined that the Trail
Smelter should be enjoined from causing future damage to Washington
crops and timber.22 In order to make this determination, the Tribunal
first examined available sources of international law. Finding no clear
precedent in existing international legal principles, 23 the Tribunal
turned to decisions of the United States Supreme Court24 and to a
Swiss decision 25 for guidance. Relying on these authorities, the Tribu-
nal formulated its seminal rule of international law:
No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
or the properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quence . ... 26
Commentators who have accepted the Trail Smelter Arbitration as
a basis for an international duty among states have defined that duty in
somewhat broader terms. Gerhard von Glahn maintains that states
16. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941).
17. Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter Trail,
B.C., April 15, 1935, United States-Canada, 49 Stat. 3245, T.S. No. 893, 3 R. Int'l Arb.




21. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1938.
22. Id at 1962.
23. Id at 1963.
24. E.-., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1905); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296 (1920); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1930).
25. Canton of Solthurn v. Canton of Aargau, 26 ATF 444 (1900), cited in 15 AM. J.
INT'L L. 172 (1921).
26. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1938, 1965.
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have an international duty to see to it that no acts are performed within
their jurisdictions that pollute the waters or air of neighboring states.27
Professor von Glahn relies largely on the Trail Smelter Arbitration in
developing this concept of duty.28
Another commentator states that the specific rule laid down in the
Trail Smelter Arbitration has been extended to any "damage caused by
or deprivations resulting from manipulation of environmental vari-
ables."29 Finally, the late Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas
cited the Trail Smelter Arbitration in partial support of the proposition
that international law embraces a broad duty to refrain from causing
environmental harm to neighboring states.30
These commentators have not expressly extended the rule of the
case to include a duty to compensate for environmental damage. How-
ever, the facts of the Trail Smelter Arbitration suggest that once a trans-
national environmental injury has occurred, there is also a duty on the
part of the polluting state to compensate.3
In sum, the Trail Smelter Arbitration is the seminal decision defin-
ing an international environmental duty between nation states. Subse-
quent international decisions have accepted the rule of this case as one
of customary international law.32
B. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
A second source of a state's environmental duty to neighboring
states can be found in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. This
Principle was formulated at the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment which met in Stockholm in June 1972.33 The
27. See G. VON GLAHN, supra note 11, at 175.
28. Id
29. Note, New Perspectives on International Environmental Law, 82 YALE L.J. 1659,
1665 (1973).
30. Douglas, Environmental Problems ofthe Oceans; the Needfor International Controls
I ENVT'L L. 149, 154 (1971). See also Tiewul, InternationalLaw and Nuclear Test Explosions
on the High Seas, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45 (1974).
31. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
32. See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22
("and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States."); Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) 24 I.L.R.
101, 111-112 (Arbitral Tribunal, November 16, 1957), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957),
reprintedin 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959) ("the correlative duty not to injure the interests of
a neighboring state. .. ").
33. REPORT OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. .48/14, at 2-65 (1972) reprinted in 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 1726, 105, 118 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Stockholm Conference].
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Principle declares that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.34
This Principle amounts to a broad international acceptance of the
rule of the Trail Smelter Arbitration.35 One commentator has suggested
that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration should be understood to
encompass responsibility for damage from land-based sources of at-
mospheric and marine pollution.36 Although this interpretation only
refers to land-based sources of atmospheric and marine pollution, there
is no apparent reason why Principle 21 should not also be construed to
encompass fixed marine-based sources of pollution operating within a
state's jurisdiction or control, including drilling platforms operating
within a state's territorial waters.
Under Principle 21, as under the rule of the Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion, primary responsibility to ensure that activities do not cause trans-
national environmental damage is assigned to the various states. This
suggests that if a transnational environmental injury occurs, the injured
nation is entitled to compensation directly from the sovereign body
which has jurisdiction over the activity causing the damage. This
would be true even where the activity which causes damage is privately
owned and operated.37 The sovereign would then be left to seek com-
pensation from those directly responsible for the activity through its
domestic legal system.
Thus direct compensation from a sovereign can be had where the
activity causing the harm was not only located within the sovereign's
jurisdiction, but was also directly within the sovereign's control (as was
the drilling rig operated by PEMEX in the Bay of Campeche).
Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration adds another element to
the general policy enunciated in Principle 21. It states that:
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law re-
34. 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 118.
35. The result of the vote on Principle 21 by the nations represented at the Conference
was 112 in favor, none against, and 10 abstentions. UN Doc. A/PV. 2112, at 6 (1972).
36. McDougal, The Protection ofthe Environment and WorldPublic Order: Some Recent
Developments, 45 Miss. L.J. 1085, 1117 (1974).
37. This has, in fact, been the course followed by many international decisions in this
area. See generally cases cited at note 32 supra.
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garding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by the activities within the juris-
diction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
38
To some extent, the nations of the world have heeded Principle 22's
suggestion. Treaties have established environmental standards and lia-
bility systems for oil tanker spills and pollution caused by the normal
operation of ships. 39 However, no treaty has addressed the problem of
liability for transnational damage caused by offshore oil rig blowouts."
C. The Concept of Territorial Sovereignty
A third source of a nation's duty to prevent activities within its
jurisdiction from causing environmental damages to other states is ter-
ritorial sovereignty.4 Generally, territorial sovereignty is defined as a
state's right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its own fixed terri-
tory.42 As a corollary, a state has a right to exclude unwanted intru-
sions into its territory. Such unwanted intrusions would include
pollutants which cross national boundaries. One commentator has
stated that "[i]t is still the sovereign right to territorial integrity which
serves as the primary legal defense of a state affected by transnational
pollutants.
43
Before a state can claim damages for transnational pollution based
on a violation of its territorial sovereignty, it must show that the pollu-
tion caused "material damage."'  The threshold requirement for a
claim based on a violation of territorial sovereignty (le., "material
damage") is established by merely showing that a transnational cross-
ing of pollutants has occurred. 45 The extent of damage caused by the
38. Stockholm Conference, supra note 33, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 118.
39. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. 4900 (1961), 327 U.N.T.S. 3 (1959), amendedin 1962,
17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332 (1967), amendedin 1969, 28 U.S.T. 1205,
T.I.A.S. 8505 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Oil Pollution Convention]; International Conven-
tion on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damages, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS (I.L.M.) 284 (1972).
40. See Lay, supra note 10.
41. See Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution, 69
AM. J. INT'L. L. 50, 54 (1975).
42. See G. VON GLAHN, supra note 11, at 65.
43. Hand, supra note 41, at 54. It should be noted that Professor Hand's analysis of
territoriality may suggest that this concept should be classified not as a "third source" of
international environmental duties, but rather as the underlying foundation of the duties
enunciated in Principle 21 and the Trail Smelter Arbitration.
44. Id at 66.
45. Id at 75-76.
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pollutants would determine the amount of compensation to be paid to
the injured state.
The principle of territorial sovereignty was the basis for Australia's
claim against France in the Nuclear Tests Case.46 In that case, Austra-
lia sought an injunction in the International Court of Justice to prevent
France from conducting further atmospheric testing of nuclear devices
in the southern Pacific Ocean. Australia based its claim on its sover-
eign right to exclude fallout caused by the test blasts from crossing into
its territory. The International Court of Justice declined to rule on
Australia's claim because the court considered it moot. Prior to the
conclusion of the suit, France agreed to cease testing nuclear devices in
the South Pacific.47 However, the case underscores the utility of territo-
rial sovereignty as a tool for seeking injunction and damages in cases of
transnational pollution.4"
III. AN ANALOGY IN CONVENTIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION OF OIL
POLLUTION FROM SHIPS
The three sources of customary international law discussed above
indicate that there is a widely accepted duty of a state to ensure that
activities carried on within its jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other states or to areas beyond the limits of
its national jurisdiction. Once a transnational environmental injury
has occurred, there is a duty on the part of that state to compensate
those who were injured.49 Partially in recognition of this duty, several
multilateral international conventions have addressed the problem of
oil pollution damage caused by discharges or spills from ships.50
Although none of these conventions specifically address the prob-
lem of oil pollution damage caused by oil platform blowouts, some le-
gal mechanisms utilized in those conventions may prove useful in a
future convention which addresses this problem.
46. [19741 I.C.J. 253.
47. Id at 272.
48. See Hickey, Custom and Land-Based Pollution of the High Seas, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 409, 455-57 (1978).
49. See text accompanying notes 31 and 37 supra.
50. See the preamble to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45, 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Civil Liability Con-
vention]; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973,
12 I.L.M. 1319, 1319 (1973) enactedby Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, Pub. L. No. 96-
478, 94 Stat. 2297 (1980).
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A. The International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage5' (Civil Liability Convention) addresses the problem of liabil-
ity for transnational pollution damage caused by oil tanker spills. 2
The Civil Liability Convention does not cover oil platform spills. 3
The problem that the Civil Liability Convention addresses is
closely analogous to the problem of transnational environmental dam-
age caused by drilling platform blowouts.5 4
There are several basic (and conceptually important) similarities
between transnational damage caused by a tanker spill and transna-
tional injury caused by an offshore drilling platform blowout. First,
both situations present the prospect of extensive liability to the individ-
ual or entity found to be responsible for the underlying activity.5 Sec-
51. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 50, at 45. The signatories to the convention
include Belgium, Cameroon, the Republic of China, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic,
Monaco, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugo-
slavia. See Final Act of the International Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, 1969, 9
I.L.M. 20 (1970).
52. Brown, The Conventional Law of the Environment, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 203, 224
(1973).
53. For the purpose of the Civil Liability Convention, a "ship" is defined as "any sea-
going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as
cargo." Art. 1, para. 1. "Pollution damage" is defined as "loss or damage caused outside the
ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the
ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preventive
measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures." Art. 1, para. 6.
54. Two other conventions between nations involve attempts to protect the marine envi-
ronment from oil discharged from ships. They are the Oil Pollution Convention, supra note
39, and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note
50, which was intended to supersede the Oil Pollution Convention. However, the thrust of
these Conventions is to promulgate minimum standards designed to prevent damage to the
marine environment, rather than to establish a scheme of compensation for damage that has
already occurred. The Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships discusses
special standards and procedures required to minimize the discharge of oil occurring during
the normal operation of an offshore drilling rig at annex I, reg. 21. Although promulgation
of technical standards designed to minimize the risk of oil platform blowouts is worthy of
further international attention, it is a subject which is beyond the scope of this Note.
55. As stated earlier in the text, as of Sept. 23, 1979, suits seeking $255 million in dam-
ages had already been filed in federal district court against the various defendants in the Bay
of Campeche case. See text accompanying note 5 supra. As of Nov. 25, 1980, the total
claims arising out of this incident were estimated at $375 million. L.A. Daily J., Nov. 24,
1980, at 2, col. 3. Furthermore, this total could reach $455 million if the federal government
decides to sue PEMEX to recover $80 million authorized by the House of Representatives to
compensate U.S. citizens for damages arising from the spill. Id and note 5 supra.
Damages sought in suits arising out of tanker spills have also been substantial. For
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ond, both of the underlying activities are extremely valuable to the
international community, and that community has a strong economic
interest in promoting those activities. Finally, it would be impossible
through the exercise of due care to totally eliminate the risks of harm
inherent in those activities. 6
Given these similarities, it is reasonable to examine some of the
legal mechanisms utilized in conventions addressing liability for tanker
spills and to test their applicability to the situation in which transna-
tional pollution is caused by oil rig blowouts.
The Civil Liability Convention incorporates several of these "legal
mechanisms." The first mechanism is the standard of care which the
Civil Liability Convention places on the owner of a vessel. Subject to
specified exceptions, the ship owner is held strictly liable. 7 Part of the
example, the Torrey Canyon spill, involving the wreck of a supertanker off the coast of
Brittany in 1967, resulted in claims somewhat in excess of $12 million (measured in 1967
dollars). Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward New Solution to the Problem of Traumatic
Oil Spillage, 2 CONN. L. REv. 632, 639 (1970). The Amoco Cadiz disaster, involving a spill
from a supertanker off the coast of France in 1979, resulted in claims by the French Govern-
ment against Amoco International for $300 million. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 2;
N.Y. Times New Service-Supplementary Material, Sept. 15, 1979, at 69. Although the Bay
of Campeche oil spill eventually became the largest in history, nine of the world's ten largest
oil spills have involved tankers. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1979, at 18, col. 1.
56. Students of the law of torts will recognize a similarity between the three factors
mentioned here and some of the factors to be considered in determining whether an activity
is "abnormally dangerous" for the purpose of strict liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520, especially factors (b), (c), and (f).
It may, in fact, be reasonable to argue that both activities should, indeed, be classified as
"abnormally dangerous." Dean Prosser included oil wells among those "absolute nui-
sances" for which strict liability will attach. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 512-13 (4th ed. 1971). For a good discussion of strict liability as applied to tanker
spills see Ingram, Oil Pollution-Rylands v. Fletcher, 121 NEw L.J. 183 (1971). However,
these common factors have a broader and independent significance in the context in which
they are considered in this Note.
57. Article III of the Civil Liability Convention, supra note 50, states:
1. Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at
the, time of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series of occurrences at
the time of the first such occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage
caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from the ship as a result of the
incident.
2. No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that the
damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by
a third party, or
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Govern-
ment or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.
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rationale for selecting strict liability as the standard of care for the Civil
Liability Convention can be traced to the difficulties inherent in recov-
ering for oil pollution damage based on negligence, trespass, or nui-
sance."8 The exceptions to liability provided by the Convention are
similar or identical to the common exceptions allowed in strict
liability.59
Secondly, the Civil Liability Convention imposes a limit on liabil-
ity.6" This limit is based on the ship's tonnage, 6 with an absolute lia-
bility ceiling of 210 million "francs."6 2 An owner is not protected by
these limitations on liability if the spill is caused by his own "actual
fault."63 In order to avail himself of the liability ceiling, the owner is
required to set up a fund equal to the limit of his liability with the court
or other competent authority.6' This fund must be deposited in the
state or states which are claiming injury from the spill.65 The Civil
Liability Convention also outlines general procedures for the distribu-
tion of the fund,66 and gives exclusive competence to determine all
matters relating to the distribution of the fund to the courts of the state
where the fund has been deposited.67
A third point of interest is the Convention requirement that ships
exceeding a cargo capacity of 2,000 tons be certified as being financially
3. If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially
either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who
suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person, the owner may be exon-
erated wholly or partially from his liability to such person.
See also Brown, supra note 52, at 224; Ingram, supra note 56, at 183-84; Healy, The Interna-
tional Convention on Civil LiabiltYfor Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 317,
319 (1969-70).
58. Ingram, supra note 56, at 183.
59. Id at 183-84. Article III, para. 2(c) of the Civil Liability Convention parts company
with traditional strict liability theory. The exception was inserted because of a fear that one
government might benefit from the negligence of another. Id at 184.
60. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 50, art. V.
61. Id art. V, para. 1.
62. Id This franc should not be confused with the Swiss or French franc. It is a unit of
measure specifically defined by the Convention. Paragraph 9 defines a franc as: "a unit
consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred.
The amount mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be converted into the national
currency of the State in which the fund is being constituted .. " The Convention was
drawn up during a period of stable gold prices. Based on 1969 gold prices the value of 210
million francs as defined by the Convention was $14,112,000. Healy, supra note 57, at 321.
With current gold prices, the figure may be as much as ten times greater.
63. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 50, at art. V, para. 2.
64. Id art. V, para. 3.
65. Id art. IX, para. 1.
66. Id arts. V, VI.
67. Id art. IX, para. 3.
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responsible up to the applicable limit of liability. 8 Under the Conven-
tion, any compensation claim may be brought directly against the in-
surer or other person providing security for liability.69
Finally, the Civil Liability Convention provides that a nation has a
duty to directly compensate another nation for damage caused by spills
from ships which it owns.70 Furthermore, a ship owned by a state must
be certified (as private ships must be certified) as being financially re-
sponsible for damages up to the limits prescribed by the Civil Liability
Convention.7'
It is apparent from the language of article XI that the Civil Liabil-
ity Convention incorporates the "restrictive immunity" doctrine.72
Under this doctrine, sovereign acts of a government (jure imperil) are
protected by sovereign immunity, while commercial activities (jure ges-
tionis) are not.73 The treatment of nationalized oil companies under
this doctrine, and its importance in the context of the Bay of Campeche
spill, is discussed in section IV of this Note, infra.
B. The International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage
After the Civil Liability Convention was approved, it was recog-
nized that the requirments for financial responsibility did not afford
full protection for victims in all cases. In 1969, a resolution was at-
tached calling for an International Legal Conference to consider an In-
ternational Compensation Fund.74 This led to the drafting in 1971 of
the Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (International Fund
Convention).75
The three main purposes of the International Fund Convention
68. Id art. VII, paras. 1, 2.
69. Id art. VII, para. 8.
70. "With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and used for commercial pur-
poses, each State shall be subject to suit. . . and shall waive all defences on its status as a
sovereign State." Id art. XI, para. 2 (emphasis added). The Convention does not apply to
warships or other ships owned by a state which are used for governmental non-commercial
purposes. Id art. XI, para. I.
71. Id art. VII, para. 12.
72. See note 70 supra.
73. I. BROWNLIE, supra note I1, at 327.
74. Resolution on Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 66 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Resolution]. See also
Healy, supra note 57, at 322.
75. Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
No. 2]
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are: 1) to provide compensation for pollution damage to the extent
that the protection provided by the Civil Liability Convention is inade-
quate; 2) to provide relief to shipowners in respect to the extra
financial burden placed on them by the Civil Liability Convention;
76
and, 3) to more equitably distribute the costs of oil pollution damage
among the industries involved in bringing petroleum products to
market.77
The International Fund Convention seeks to fulfill the first.pur-
pose by increasing the 210 million franc liability limit78 established by
the Civil Liability Convention. Under the International Fund Conven-
tion, the liability ceiling is increased to 450 million francs for any one
incident.79 The International Fund Convention also provides compen-
sation to injured persons in situations where the ship owner could not
be held liable under the Civil Liability Convention.80 Where no ship
owner is liable, or is unable to meet this liability, the Fund will be fully
responsible up to the 450 million franc ceiling.8' Also, the Interna-
tional Fund Convention provides a mechanism by which the liability
ceiling can be raised to 900 million francs if circumstances later war-
rant the increase.
82
The International Fund Convention seeks to fulfill its second pur-
pose-to provide financial relief to shipowners-by indemnifying the
shipowner for a portion of his liability under the Civil Liability Con-
vention. This indemnification is at the rate of 1,500 francs for each ton
of the ships tonnage, or 125 million francs, whichever is less. 3
Finally, the International Fund Convention seeks to fulfill its third
goal-to facilitate a more equitable distribution of costs-by requiring
persons with an annual total of more than 150,000 tons of crude or fuel
oil transported by sea to contribute to the fund.84 This would encom-
Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972) [hereinafter cited as International
Fund Convention].
76. Id art. 2, paras. (a), (b); Healy, supra note 57, at 224.
77. The preamble of the International Fund Convention states:
the economic consequences of oil pollution damage resulting from the escape or
discharge of oil carried in bulk at sea by ships should not exclusively be borne by
the shipping industry but should in part be borne by the oil cargo interests....
International Fund Convention, supra note 75, at 284.
78. See note and accompanying text at note 62 supra.
79. International Fund Convention, supra note 75, art. 4, para. 4.
80. Id art. 4, para. 1.
81. Id art. 4, paras. 1, 4.
82. Id art. 4, para. 6.
83. Id art. 5, para. 1; Brown, supra note 52, at 224.
84. International Fund Convention, supra note 75, art. 10, para. 1. The amount to be
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pass oil companies and other large-scale users and refiners of oil. The
contribution provision insures that part of the additional cost imposed
by the Civil Liability Convention will be borne by those who benefit
from the production of offshore petroleum."
The underlying rational of the contribution provision is consistent
with environmental economic theory. Environmental economists
maintain that the "external costs" of producing and transporting a
good (such as the cost of damage to the environment caused during the
production and transportation of oil) should be reflected in the price to
the consumer so as to underscore the true cost of producing the good.
86
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE-APPLICABILITY OF
EXISTING CONVENTIONAL MECHANISMS TO
THE PROBLEM OF OFFSHORE
BLOWOUTS
At least two reasons can be put forth to explain the absence to date
of any international convention addressing the problem of transna-
tional oil pollution caused by offshore oil well blowouts.
A. Infrequency of Offshore Blowouts
Besides the Bay of Campeche spill, only one other blowout with
international consequences has received the attention of the world
press. 8 7 However, given the magnitude of the Bay of Campeche spill
contributed depends on the number of tons of oil the contributor receives via the sea. 1d
art. 11, para. 1.
85. Although it might be argued that the additional costs to shippers resulting from the
requirements of the Civil Liability Convention would be passed on to those large scale users
and refiners (and eventually on to the small consumer) through normal market pricing
mechanisms, it must be remembered that not all nations will necessarily become parties to
the Civil Liability Convention. Hence, shippers operating under the flag or ownership of a
contracting state will be forced to compete against other shippers, operating under the flag or
ownership of non-contracting states, who are not burdened by the additional financial re-
quirement of the Civil Liability Convention. Therefore, market competition would likely
prevent contracting state shippers from passing on most of these additional costs.
86. See C. SCHULZE & A. KNEESE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975) for
a good general discussion of environmental economics.
87. This was the North Sea blowout of April, 1977. An offshore oil rig operated by
Phillips Petroleum and located approximately 160 miles off the coast of Norway suffered a
cracked well pipe. This resulted in a 180-foot-high oil fountain, which spewed out 49,000
gallons of oil per hour. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1977, at 1, col. 5. The spill was capped within
a week and resulted in a loss of more than 7.5 million gallons of oil (compared to more than
100 million gallons lost in the Bay of Campeche spill). N.Y. Times, May 1, 1977, § 1, at 1,
col. 1. Although the slick created by the spill threatened the southern Norwegian and Dan-
ish coasts, five months after the spill occurred the Norwegian Institute for Marine Research
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and the legal uncertainties it brought to light, it is likely that increased
world attention will be focused on resolving some of these legal
ambiguities.88
Also, as world supplies of land-based petroleum dwindle (and
prices increase), it can be expected that oil producers will venture fur-
ther, and more often, into coastal waters in search of oil. Mexico, de-
spite the Campeche disaster, intended to drill fifty additional wells in
the Gulf of Mexico in 1979.89 Increased offshore exploration brings an
increased danger of large scale blowouts.9" Existing wells in the North
Sea still present dangers to the countries of northern Europe, and it is
conceivable that wells off the coast of California could present an envi-
ronmental menace to Mexico's Baja California.
In short, the likelihood of offshore oil well blowouts with interna-
tional consequences will increase in the future. This will bring about a
concomitant increase in the need for international solutions to the
problems presented by those spills. A logical response to the dangers
inherent in this increased offshore activity would *be an international
convention addressing the problem of liability for disastrous spills.
B. Fear of Obstructing Development
The lack of any treaty addressing the problem of offshore oil well
blowouts may also be explained by the fact that an energy-conscious
stated that the blowout caused no serious environmental damage. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,
1977, § 1, at 14, col. 3.
88. Again, an analogy can be drawn to the Civil Liability Convention:
It was the 'Torrey Canyon' disaster in Marh 1967 that really brought the
problem to the public attention. The 'Torrey Canyon' was carrying 119,000 tons of
oil when it was wrecked off the Scilly islands. The expense caused (involving clear-
ing up costs, and preventive measures) to the British and French governments and
other interests totalled about £ 6 million. The legal difficulties in recovering this
• . . caused the United Kingdom government to request the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consulative Organization . . . to set up a legal committee to consider
how these problems should be dealt with in future. The answer was a Convention
which it was hoped would harmonise the law throughout the world.
Ingram, supra note 56, at 183.
In fact, shortly after the Bay of Campeche blowout, the United States began seeking
formal agreement with Mexico providing for joint action in the event of future spills. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 8, 1979, § A, at 10, col. 2. A similar "call to arms" wis made by the Organiza-
tion for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) after the North Sea Spill. N.Y.
Times, May 2, 1977, at 36, col. 3.
89. Browne, Mexico is Rushing To Cash In on Oil Boom Despite Hazards, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1979, at 2, col. 3.
90. Id This article cites a PEMEX spokesman who "acknowledged that since the
[Ixtoc-I spill], two other offshore wells have blown out. . .. Both were brought under
control in 48 hours, the spokesman said, but he conceded that more accidents were likely."
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international community is unwilling to place any additional obstacles
in the path of petroleum exploration and development 9 and is fearful
of the tremendous liability which might attach for damage caused by
such a spill. However, this fear should not present an insurmountable
obstacle to the drafting of an international convention on the subject of
liability for offshore oil well blowouts. It can be argued that such a
convention would remove obstacles from the path of offshore explora-
tion and would serve as an incentive to exploration.
Given the current uncertain status of international liability for
these incidents, participants in an offshore oil exploration venture may
face greater risk under the current disorder than they would under an
ordered convention placing reasonable limits on liability and outlining
a predetermined standard of care. Whether or not a plaintiff has a
clear cause of action, if his damages are great enough, he is likely to
bring suit against any defendant over which he can obtain jurisdiction.
The multiplicity of suits arising out of the Bay of Campeche spill92 and
the Torrey Canyon accident 93 support this proposition. In the long run,
it may be best to face certain (but limited) liability under a comprehen-
sive international convention rather than face a large number of claims
based on less certain liability.
A convention could also allocate the burden of risk and liability
for damage among a large number of persons who benefit from off-
shore oil exploration. An international fund could be developed along
the lines of the International Fund Convention discussed previously.94
Contributions could be required of oil companies with offshore oil rigs.
These contributions might be based on the amount of oil a company
produces from its offshore facilities or on the amount of gross sales
directly attributable to offshore exploration activities. This scheme
would internalize at least part of the "external" costs of producing off-
shore oil and reflect the costs in the price of oil to the consumer.95
Unlimited liability could be avoided by setting limits on individ-
ual liability similar to those incorporated in the Civil Liability Conven-
91. Note that placing restrictions on the transport of oil in the form of additional
financial responsibility would not directy, curtail the aggregate oil supply or provide any
direct disincentive to exploration. This may be one reason why oil transport, but not oil
exploration, has been the subject of an international liability convention.
92. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
93. Comment, supra note 55, at 637-41.
94. See text accompanying notes 75-84 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra. For an interesting analysis of the liability
of offshore oil rig operators for economic harm, see Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558
(9th Cir. 1974).
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tion96 or those applied to accidents arising from the operation of
nuclear power plants.97 These limits would allow society to promote an
activity it deems necessary or desirable, even though that activity car-
ries with it the potential for immense environmental damage.
However, the liability limit for each drilling-platform blowout
should probably be somewhat higher than the ceiling placed on indi-
vidual liability by the Civil Liability Convention.98 The potential size
(and capacity for damage) of a blowout spill, as evidenced by the Bay
of Campeche incident, is much greater than the potential size of a spill
from a single tanker.
C. Other Considerations
1. Standard of Liability
Other considerations in developing a future convention merit brief
discussion. The standard of liability to be chosen in such a convention
could logically follow the lead of the Civil Liability Convention and
choose a form of strict liability as the standard.99 This should be done
primarily because offshore oil exploration will probably be classified as
an "abnormally dangerous activity."100 An additional reason is the dif-
ficulty in establishing the fact that an offshore blowout was caused by
negligence. 10
The only international document addressing the problem of liabil-
ity for oil platform blowouts' 0 2 did, in fact, adopt a form of strict liabil-
ity °3 in language almost identical to that used in the Civil Liability
Convention. 104
2. Sovereign Immunity
A second consideration is the problem of sovereign immunity and
96. See text accompanying notes 60-67 supra.
97. See Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). The Act
provides for a maximum private and governmental liability of $500 million for a single
nuclear accident. Id at 577.
98. See note 62 supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
100. See note 56 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 58 supra. There were claims that Mexico attempted to
cover up the facts of the Campeche spill. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979, § 1, at 37, col. 1. In this
hostile atmosphere, any critical dispassionate investigation into the facts of the case by either
side seems unlikely.
102. Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement, 13 I.L.M. 1409 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
OPOL].
103. Id cl. IV, para. B.
104. Id See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
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how it might be restricted in a future convention involving states with
nationalized oil companies. Again, logically, those drafting the future
convention would follow the lead of the Civil Liability Convention and
incorporate a form of "restrictive immunity."'0 5 At least one interna-
tional decision has already applied restrictive immunity against a na-
tionalized oil company, in a case involving the National Iranian Oil
Company's alleged breach of contract. 0 6 Therefore, at least for those
activities which are deemed "commercial" as opposed to "govemmen-
tal" in nature,107 it is unlikely that a nationalized oil company would be
able to avail itself of the protection of sovereign immunity, even in the
absence of a convention specifically abrogating that protection. 0 8
3. Scope of Coverage
A third consideration in any future convention addressing the
problem of offshore blowouts is the scope of the territory to be covered
by the agreement. The Civil Liability Convention attached liability for
pollution damage "wherever. . .it may occur."'1 9 However, the scope
of the Civil Liability Convention was necessarily global, since it ad-
dressed a problem that was global in nature. The constant meander-
bags of oil tankers, sailing under a variety of national ownerships and
registries, would make a tanker spill agreement between only two or
three states ineffective. Under such an agreement, only a small fraction
of the tankers entering the waters of a contracting state would be bound
by the Convention.
The problem of oil well blowouts, however, could be addressed at
a more "local" level. Oil rig platforms generally operate in a narrow
band along a nation's continental shelf or in relatively shallow seas.
Therefore, an agreement between only two or three nations may prove
effective in providing a scheme of liability for offshore blowouts. For
example, an agreement between the United States and Mexico, or
among the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium, may be on a scale
sufficient to provide true protection to the contracting states.
A small scale agreement already exists: the Offshore Pollution Li-
ability Agreement (OPOL).1'0 OPOL is an agreement among thirteen
105. See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
106. N.V. Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Company, 1969 N.J. 1329, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 152 (1970) (Hague Court of Appeal).
107. Id See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
108. See Comment, supra note 7, at 10221.
109. See note 53 supra.
110. OPOL, supra note 102.
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oil companies"' designed to provide compensation to persons or states
who are injured by an offshore oil well blowout. 12 At the time it was
drafted, the agreement only applied to "offshore facilities" operating
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom." 3 However, OPOL
provides for an extension of its coverage to "offshore facilities" operat-
ing within the jurisdiction of other "designated states," 4 if the parties
to the agreement elect to amend it. OPOL also provides a $16 million
limit on liability for each incident' 15 and requires that parties to the
agreement establish and maintain their financial responsibility to fulfill
their obligations under the contract.
116
OPOL has adopted a number of the mechanisms discussed in con-
nection with the Civil Liability Convention. However, it should be
kept in mind that OPOL is not a convention between states, but a con-
tract between oil companies and certain "designated states"chosen by
those companies."'
4. Primary Liability
A final consideration in the drafting of a future convention among
nations is the determination of the location of primary liability for
damages arising from an offshore blowout. Both the Civil Liability
Convention and OPOL" 8 place primary liability on the owner or oper-
ator of the tanker or oil well involved. However, in a convention
among nations which addresses this problem, it may be best to make
the contracting states primarily liable to claimants.
There are three reasons why a state should be held primarily
liable:
1) direct liability should serve as an added incentive to all con-
tracting states to insure that all offshore oil rig operators are
financially responsible to the convention limits;
2) any burden of recovering damages from the private owner
or operator would be placed on the nation which most directly
I 11. The parties to the agreement are: Amoco, British Petroleum, Burmah, Compagnie
franqaise des p6troles, Continental, Exxon, Gulf, Hamilton, Mobil, Petrofina, Phillips, Shell,
and Texaco. Id at 1409.
112. Id cl. IV.
113. Id cl. I, paras. 4-7.
114. Id cl. I, para. 4, cl. X.
115. Id cl. IV.
116. Id cl. II, para. C(2).
117. Id cl. I, para. 4.
118. Id cl. IV; Civil Liability Convention, supra note 50, art. III, para. 1.
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benefitted from the offshore activities (in the form of employment,
taxes, license fees, etc.); and
3) it would be consistent with the Trail Smelter case and Prin-
ciple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in emphasizing a nation's duty
to see to it that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states or to the common
environment." 9
Once the nation had satisfied claims against it, it would be entitled
to full indemnification from the private interest responsible for the
damage. Indemnification would be sought through mechanisms estab-
lished in its own internal legal system.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent oil pollution catastrophe involving the United States
and Mexico has demonstrated the need for international cooperation to
address the problem of pollution from offshore drilling rigs. There is
already a basis in international law for establishing the liability of a
polluting state. By using principles already established for related
problems, such as oil tanker pollution, a mechanism could be created
for'dealing with future incidents of transnational pollution. As the
need for fossil fuel continues to grow, so in turn does the likelihood of
the next pollution disaster, and the need to allocate this risk.
119. See text accompanying notes 26-32 and 33-37 supra.
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